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THE OHIO "BLUE SKY" CASES. 
"* * * Shall we indict one man for making a fool 
of another! Let him bring his action." Lord Hor,T, C. 
J., in Regina v. Jones, (z704), 2 Ld. Raymond, IOIJ. 
"The offense that is indictable must be such a one as 
affects the public. As if a man uses false weights and 
measures, and sells by them to many of his customers. 
* * *; so, if a man defrauds another, under false 
tokens. For these are deceptions that common care and 
prudence are not sufficient to guard against. * * *" 
"But here, it is a mere frivate imposition or decep-
tion. * * *" 
''Therefore (though I "may be sorry for it in the 
present case, as circumstance_d), the judgment mu.st be 
arrested." Lord MANSFU::r,n, in Rex v. Wheatley 
(z76z), 2 Burr. n25. 
No5. 
T HE ancient notion that private £rand lies beyond the domain of public law did not long survive the statements of it that have 
been quoted.1 Our legislation, expressing always the chang-
ing moral standards of the people, has directed the sanctions of the 
criminal law, step by step, ever against new forms of overreaching 
· and imposition. Numerous illustrations might be cited to show the 
growing repugnance of the public mind toward frauds and cheats, 
and the tendency to recognize them as offenses invoking the restraint 
of public action as well as the redress of priv:ate injuries.2 
1 The general statute of England punishing the obtaining of property by false 
pretenses was enacted in 1757 (30 Geo. 2, c. 24) repealed and re-enacted in 182?; (7 & 8 
Geo. 4 cc. 27, 29). 
2 At early common Jaw. the plaintiff might have a capias in process or execution 
only when the defendant had committed force (Harbert's Case (1585) 3 Coke, nb); 
and later. the ca. sa. was extended by statute so as to be available substantially when-
ever a fi. fa. might be had; but when the reforms of the first half of the nineteenth 
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The reasons for this development of public policy are not diffi-
cult to trace or conjecture, and we need not stop to mention them. 
It is sufficient to say that they are of such a character as to suggest 
most naturally the application of that method of the police power 
which has been employed in the Ohio statute sustained by the Su-
preme Court of the United States in Hallv. Geiger-Jones Company.2• 
This method may be designated as direct prevention. By the use 
of some such descriptive term the manner in which the police power 
of the state is asserted in this legislation may be distinguished from 
the indirect way in which the object of preventing the kind of frauds 
at which the act is aimed might have been at least measurably at-
tained by the enactment of penal laws in the ordinary form, punish-
ing the evil acts sought to be repressed after their commission. This 
distinction is thought to be important, because it is believed that no 
question as to the constitutionality of a law making it a crime lmow-
ingly to sell worthless securities or worthless land located outside 
of the state could or would have been seriously raised~ Yet the sole 
foundation .for the exercise of the police. power in such form would 
have been the prevention of fraud. In the enlightened view of 
modem times prevention of public evils is looked upon as the prin-
cipal object, at least, of the criminal law, especially that part of it 
which Cleals with subject matter formerly described as mala pro-
hibita. The prevention aimed at by imposing punishments after the 
fact is, however, indirect and consequential; the state is primarily 
interested in preventing the evils, rather than in p~ishing the of-
fenders in any vindictive spirit. Therefore, and because the activi-
ties engendering the particular wrongs sought to be repressed are 
such as at once to suggest and to make easy of application a method 
<>f direct prevention, it seems quite natural to find some twenty-six 
states enacting "Blue Sky" laws of the same general nature. All 
these laws, however they may differ in detail, have in common the 
elements of inspection and licensure. That is, all of them interpose 
between the business of dealing in certain. things--corporate stocks, 
bonds and (in some cases) lands located outside of the state-on 
the one hand and the public, on the other hand, as it were a screen, 
through which the good, being ascertained to be such, may pass, but 
by which the bad may be winnowed out ·and prevented from becom-
ing the means of imposition and fraud. · 
That such a method of what may be termed prophylactic legisla-
tion is a natural development will at once appear when it is remem-
century came, they limited process and execution against the body generally to cases 
of fraud, substituting this criterion for that set up when the writs were originally 
invented. 
h 37 Sup. Ct. 217. 
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bered that it is really nothing more than the method which has been 
privately applied in the conduct of the general business affected by 
such regulations. Just as private censorship of motion picture films 
preceded public censorship and unquestionably suggested the model 
of such legislation as was sustained in Mutual Film Co. v. Ohio In-
dustrial Commission,8 so the methods of the stock exchanges, applied 
in the lisµitg of· securities for sale therein, have become thoroughly 
familiar, and may have at least unconsciously suggested the policy 
of applying them in the legislation under discussion.' 
T)le precise manner in which this method of the police power is· 
. · employed in the Ohio "Blue Sky" law may be abstracted as follows: 
I. All "dealers" are required to obtain from a "commissioner" 
(the superintendent of banks, acting ex officio and through a deputy) 
a license, before offering to dispose of. any "securities" in Ohio; 
and to file with such "commissioner", before disposing of particular 
"securities", certain information with respect thereto. 
By an elaborate series of d.efinitions and exceptions, substantial 
exemptions from these two requirements are made. For example, 
a license is not required from. an owner, not the issuer or under-
writer, who disposes of his own property on his own account, other-
wise than as a regular business; from a national bank, nor from a 
state bank, with certain restrictions as to the latter ; from a trustee 
executing his trust, nor a pledgee selling in due course; from one, 
not the issuer, who disposes to a licensee or a regular dealer; from 
the issuer disposing of its own securities in good faith and at a 
.. certain maximum promotion expense, no part of the issue being in 
payment for patents, l!ervices, good-will, or property not locate~ in 
the state. 
The information is not required of a licensee where the securities 
offered are sold by a member of a stock exchange at a ma.Ximum 
commission of t%, or- are such that their value may be ascertained 
from market reports or standard manuals of information; wh~re 
the information respecting an issue of securities has been filed by 
another licensee ; where there is a disposal for a consideration, in a 
single transaction, of five thousand dollars or more; nor where the 
securities disposed of were outstanding in the hands of bona fide 
purChasers prior to March I, 1914. The term "securities" does -not 
include ordinary commercial paper; conveyances -0f real estate; nor 
•236 u. s . .230. 
4 
"" • • The requirement is not unreasonable or inappropriate. It extends to the 
general market something of the safeguards that arc given to trading upon the ex-
changes· and stock .boards of the country, safeguards that experience has adopted as 
advantageous". Opinion of Mr. Justice McKcnna, in the principal case. 
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where not judicially declared invalid and there is no default in pay-
ment, mortgage bonds and notes (but othenvise as to corporate 
bonds more than 50% of an issue of which is not included in a sale 
to one purchaser) ; securities the issuance of which has been au.,. 
thorized by the state public utilities commission; nor stocks of banks, 
etc., subject to national or state examination and supervision. 
2. An issuer ~r undenvriter of securities must, before offering 
to dispose of them for the purpose of organization or promotion, or 
flotation after organization, secure from the "Commissioner" (who, 
in cases of insurance companies, is for this purpose the superintend-
ent cif insurance), a "certificate" based upon certain information. 
But this requirement is greatly limited in the scope of its application 
by exceptions, among which are included, generally, the same kinds 
of cases excepted from the requirement of information exacted from 
a licensee, and above abstracted, and in addition, the following: 
a. Where the underwriter has actually purchased the issue for 
not less than ninety per cent. of the price at which he offers to sell 
the securities thereof; 
b. · Where the securities are those of a common carrier; 
c. Where the securities are those of a domestic. corporation en-
gaged principally in manufacturing, transportation, coal mining or 
quarrying, and at least a. part of the property on which they are 
predicated is located in the state ; 
d. Where the securities are those of a real estate company, all of 
whose property on which they are predicated is located in the state. 
3. Both licensure and certification are required as conditions of 
dealing in real estate not located in Ohio (there being here, also 
certain exceptions, which it is not necessary to observe.) 
4. The applicant for license must furnish to the commissioner 
certain information about his business, and fi1e an irrevocable con-
sent to be sued in any action arising out of the fraudulent disposal 
of securities, in the courts of Franklin County, Ohio, and to accept 
notice by registered mail as a substitute for personal service of 
summons. 
Notice of the application must be published in a newspaper circu· 
latillg in the place where tpe business is to be carried on. The ap-
plication may not be acted on until the expiration of one week, but 
must be acted on within twenty days after proof of publication. 
Pending final disposition of an application, the "commissioner" may 
issue a temporary or provisional license. Licenses must be renewed 
annually, as of the first day of January. Additional licensure is re-
quired for each agent of the principal licensee. 
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The eondition of licensure is described as follows: "If the 'com-
missioner' be satisfied of the good repute in business of such appli-
cant and * * * agents". 
Revocation of licenses, and refusal to renew them, is authorized 
upon the following alternative conditions to be ascertained by the 
"commissioner". 
a. That the licensee is of bad business repute; 
b. That he has violated the act; 
c. That he is engaged, or is about to engage, under favor of the 
license, in illegitimate business or in fraudulent transactions. 
Revocation of a license prevents re-licensure of the dealer for a 
period of six months: Five days' notice of revocation, refusal to 
grant, or refusal to renew, must be given by the "commissioner" to 
the applicant or licensee, specifying the reasons for the intended 
action. Within thirty days from the date of such action the licensee 
or applicant may appeal to the Common Pleas Court of Franklin 
· C9uilty for a reversal of the action complained of. The commis-
sioner's answer must be filed within eight days, and must set up the 
groJltlds of his action previously assigned in the notice, and others 
which may subsequently be discovered. AI_l immediate hearing may· 
be secured. The burden of proof rests upon the plaintiff, but the 
judgment of the court is final as to the "commissionert', though not 
(apparently) as to the plaintiff. 
5. , Similar procedure in the issuance of the "certificate'.' which 
has been des'cribed is provided for in the act. The condition of 
issuance is expressed as follows : 
"If it shall appear that the law h~s been complied with and that 
the business of the applicant is not fraudulently conducted, and that 
the proposed disposal of such securities is not on unfair terms, and 
that the issuer, or vendor is solvent." · 
The "commissioner" must act "within a reasonable time". He 
may revoke a certificate "when he has reason to believe that the busi-
ness of the holder thereof is being fraudulently conducted, or that 
· such securities or other property are being disposed of upon grossly 
unfair terms, or that the issuer of the securities is insolvent". The 
applicant has the same right to judicial review in the case of the 
certificate as is afforded to the applicant for license. 
The act provides, of course, a schedule of fees, and imposes upon 
applicants certain expenses.5 
•The legislation above abstracted may be found in 103 Ohio Laws 743, 104 Ohio 
Laws no, and 106 Ohio Laws 363. (See supplement to Page & Adams' General Code 
of Ohio, H 6373-1, 6373·2+ 
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As has been suggested, the end of such legislation as this-the pre-
vention of certain easily perpetrated frauds-is certainly within the 
police power !Jf the state. Obviously, the means chosen for its .ac-
complishment afford the only point of attack available to those who 
would assail its validity on constitutional grounds. That is to say, __ _ 
the particular method of the police power, and not its substantive 
extent, is all that may be seriously called in question under our con-
stitution. 
From the viewpoint of the Supreme Court of the United States 
the fact,. hereinbefore mentioned, that over half the states of the 
Union had chosen to apply this method could not have been without 
its weight.6 Nor would that court be wholly unmindful of the sig-
nificance of the fact that the Ohio law had been enacted under the 
direct sanction and authority of a constitutional amendment adopted 
by the electors of Ohio in 1912.7 
Neither of these_ considerations are explicitly mentioned by Mr. 
Justice McKsNNA in his opinion. They arc: referred to here, hc.w-
ever, because of the attitude evinced by some of the special District 
Courts toward the general policy of such legislation. 
No fewer than six adverse decisions respecting the constitution-
ality of "Blue Sky" laws of various states had been rendered by such 
special District Courts prior to the decision of the Supreme Court 
in the principal case.8 In these decisions, so far as reported, there 
is evinced what is believed to be a lamentable lack of appreciation 
of the weight of the evidence of public conviction as to the necessity 
for adopting the method under examination. All of them ignore this 
evidence, and assume to decide this fundamental question for them-
selves, some in one way, some in the other.9 
•See Otis v. Parker, 187 U.S. 606; Muller v. Oregon, 208 U. S. 421>, .;zx; Noble 
State Bank v. Haskell, 219 U. S. 1041 III; German·Alliance Ins. Co. v, Lewis, 233 
U. S. 389, 412, etc. 
~ "* • • Corporations may be classified and there may be conferred upon proper 
• • • officers such supervisory powers over their organization, business and issue and 
sale of stocks and securities and over the business and sale of the stocks and securities 
of foreign corporations and joint stock companies in this state, as may be prescribed 
by law. • • ... (Article XIII, §:z, Ohio Constitution, as amended September 3, 1912). 
•Alabama & N. O. Transp. Co. v. -Doyle, 210 Fed. 173 (The first Michigan act) ; 
'Villiam R. Compton Co. v. Allen, 216 Fed. 357 (the Iowa law); Bracey v. Darst, 218 
Fed. 482 (the West Virginia act); N. W. Halsey & Co. v. Merrick, 228 Fed. Sos. (the 
second Michigan act); Geiger-Jones Co. v. Turner, 231> Fed. 233 (the Ohio law); and 
the unreported decree in Sioux Falls Stockyards Co. v. Caldwell (the South Dakota 
law; see 230 Fed. 236). • 
9 
"When we • • • recall that the prohibition applies to a private business, the 
question at once presents itself whether frauds and opportunities for fraud sufficiently 
characterize the business to justify its entire prolu'bition save under drastic restrictions. 
We cannot shut our eyes to the fact, which all men know, that, as compared with the 
total dealings in securities covered and contingently prohibited by this act, those which 
may fairly be suspected to be of a fraudulent character are a very trilling portion": Per 
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It is scarcely to be expected that any two processes of legal reason-
ing proceeding from viewpoints as divergent as these would end in 
accord. All these courts were dealing with the police ·power, which, 
being the exercise of society's right of self-defense, is always theo-
retically limited.by the rule of necessity, and by no other rule. The 
significant thing about the decisions on both sides, is that the prem-
ises are in ev.ery instance assumptions of facts "which all men !mow", 
to quote from the opinion in the first Michigan case. It is obvious 
curiam, Alabama &c. Co. v. Doyle, supra, citing People v. Circuit Judge, 124 Mich. 
664, 667. 
"* • • In one sense we think this evil has been fully provided for. So far as we 
know, the states uniformly have criminal statutes against the procurement of money• 
• • • under • • * false prefenses • • • and the civil right of the victim • • • to re-
cover back the money • • • so secured is universally upheld and enforced. In another 
sense some of the states may have failed to meet their full obligation to the citizenship 
of the whole country, in that they have indiscriminately granted charters to corporations 
without safeguarding its citizenship • * • from • • • fraudulent • • • organizations, for-
getting perhaps the homely maxim that 'an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of 
cure'." Dayton, D. J., in Bracey v. Darst. , 
(The learned judge seems to appreciate the appropriateness of prevention, but would 
apparently limit it to such restrictions as may operate upon the issuing corporation itself 
in the state of its origin. The intimation that the statutes against obtaining property 
by false pretenses constitute "full provision" for the ~ brings out the issue quite 
squarely). · · 
• Contrast these statements with the following: 
"The statute here involved was intended to prevent, or at least check, one of the 
most generally recognized and harmful evils of economic life. With increasing facilitica 
of communication ~ sorta of visionary schemes are imposed upon the public by setling 
stocks, bonds and other papers • • • calling for returns on the investment. Nothing 
· seems plainer than the right of the legislature under the police po;wer to provide by 
statute a reasonable method of having these ·schemes examined into by. some public 
authority and requiring those who would scll to the public securities based on them to 
make a showing of good faith, solvency, and a reasonable chance of return on the in-' 
vestment''. Woods, C. J., dissenting, in Bracey v. Darst, p. 497, referring at page 498, 
to railway regulation statutes, inspection laws, insurance company regulations, and the 
like, with decisions thereunder. 
"* • • These instances have been so frequent that the United States Post• Office 
Department has estimated that the people of this country have been losing annually 
more than one hundred millions of dollars by speculative schemes which have no more 
substantial basis than so many feet of 'blue sky'. • • • This state has sought to protect 
'its people, not by forbidding such tr~ctions but by the very reasonable requirement 
that when parties • * • propose to do business in our borders, they must submit their 
statement of assets and the nature of their business to the insurance commissioner''. 
State v. Agey (N. C., 1916) 88 S. E. 727: the reference may be to the report of the 
postmaster general, 1913, p. 97; same, 1914, P· go. 
"Experience has demonstrated the fact that some of the grossest frauds have been 
perpetrated. on the public by investment companies. • • * Such regulations are proper 
=d wholesome. • • • The national courts • • • are only clothed with jurisdiction 
to prosecute those who • • • make use of the mails, and only after the commission of 
the offense. • • • The state alone can enact laws to prevent the commission of those 
crimes. Legislation to prevent crime is of greater benefit to society than the punish-
ment of the offender after the crime has been committed and innocent persons have 
"been made to suffer." Standard Home Co. v. Davis, 217 Fed. 904-919, where a bill for 
injunction against the enforcement of the Arkansas "Blue Sky" law was dismissed on 
jurisdictional grounds. 
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that the real disagreement among the lower courts was as to the 
relative prevalence of fraudulent dealings in "securities" as com-
pared with the total volume of business of the same general char-
acter, which would necessarily be affected by such legislation; or, at 
the least, as to the practical necessity of the method of prevention. 
taking the whole field of business into consideration. These mooted 
points would seem to be facts, and it appears that they were actually 
treated as such, and that cognizance of them was taken through 
"judicial notice." 
The somewhat ludicrous diversity of the results of judici~l notice 
manifested in these opinions tends to prove the fallacy of making 
the validity of legislation depend upon facts thus assumed. It is re-
spectfully submitted that, however admissible these facts might be 
if clearly established, it is out of place for the judiciary to take un-
assisted judicial notice of them either contrary to the expressed 
legislative conviction or in support of it.10 The courts have always 
done lip-service to a supposed presumption of constitutionality. :f.ut 
only of late has the Supreme Court of tl).e United States led the 
way to a substantial observance of the rule. The question is not 
one of power, but one of evidence; and the judgment of the legisla-
ture-especially of twenty-six legislatures-is, after all reservations 
are made, strqng evidence of a relevant character. It has been sug-
gested, and is no doubt true; that the changing attitude of the courts 
evidences a gradual shifting from an individualistic political phil-
osophy to one Gf emphasis upon social and community interests.11 
In view of the unsatisfactory approach of all the lower courts 
toward the solution of the questions raised under the various "Blue · 
Sky" laws, it is refreshing to note the attitude of the Su:{lreme Court 
in this respect, as disclosed by the follo\ving extracts from Mr. J us-
tice McKENNA's opinion. 
"* * * The existence of evil is indi<;ated, and a belief of 
its detriment; and we shall not pause to do more than state 
that the preventi'on of deception is within the competency of 
government and that the appreciation of the consequences of 
it is not open for our review.12 
'° "It is not one of the least problems of the sociological jurist to discover a rational 
mode of advising the court of facts of which it is supposed to take judicial notice." 
Pound, "Legislation as a Social Function", 7 Pub. Am. Soc. Soc'y., 148, 161. The 
problem would seem not to be limited to the ascertainment of what might be termed 
sociological facts in the strictest sense, but to exist with respect to all facts. which 
might be the predicates of police legislation. 
11 See "Hours of Labor and Realism in Constitutional Law," by Felix Frankfurter. 
29 Harv. Law Rev. 
12 Citing the Trading Stamp Cases, 240 U. S. 342, 391. 
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"* * * It is asserted that the 'normal investment business 
of the country' and its 'individual transactions' are not sub-
ject to 'executive control', the broad contention being made 
that as such business cannot be prohibited it cannot be regu-
lated. This, indeed, is the basic principles of the opposition 
to the act. * * * 
"As broadly made, we cannot assent to these propositions. 
The reason and extent of the law we have indicated and the 
control to which individual transactions are subjected, and 
we think both are within the competency of the state. * * * 
"* * * Inconvenience may be caused by supervision and 
surveillance, but this must yield to the public welfare ; and 
against counsel's alarm of consequences, we set the judgment 
of the State." 
Not one word here as to the sacredness of a so-called "private 
business", nor as to the actual prevalence of fraud in the business, 
or lack of it. 
In this connection it is to be observed that the exemptions in the 
Ohio law are of such character and extent as to remove all serious 
claim that it unnecessarily burdens business that is clearly legitimate. 
What remains subject to inspection and licensure is that in which the 
possibility of fraud 'lurks, and concerning which it would seem rea-
sonable for the state to exercise preventive precautions if such 
measures were possible in any case. The strictures of the District 
Court upon the first Michigan statute in this respect a statute could 
not have been: applied to the Ohio law. 
This very effort to mitigate the effect of the Ohio law with re-
spect to the business as a whole was laid hold of by SATER, D. ]-:, of 
the Ohio District Court, as a weapon of attack on the ground of 
aenial of equal protection of the law.13. If the law includes all, it 
would seem that it is an unreasonable restraint; if it excludes those 
who in the opinion of the legislature do not stand in need of regu-
lation, at least to an extent equal to that required respecting others, 
it is an unreasonable classification. 
Of course, in the light of the many recent cases on the subject of 
reasonable classification, the Supreme Court brushed this point aside 
with what amounts to a show of righteous iinpatience.u 
The attempt of the law's assailants to overthrow it by the dilemma 
which has been described having failed, they had recourse, as is 
11 See 230 Fed. 245. 
••"It is enough to say they are within the power of classification which a state has." 
(Citing and quoting from Central Lumber Co. v. South Dakota, 226 U. S. 157, 160). 
It is suggested that the final word on this subject is expressed· in Lindsley v. Natural 
Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U. S. 61, 78. (Per Mr. Justice Vandevanter). 
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usual in such cases, to certain other main objections, as wen ·as to 
several of a more detailed character, which latter can not be dealt 
with here. The remaining principal points of attack were as follows : 
1. That the standards of licensure and inspection are too vaguely 
set up in the law, thus leaving to the executive officers charged with 
their application such latitud.e of discretion and individual judgment 
as to amount to the familiar "arbitrary power". 
2. That no "regulation" of a "purely private business", as dis-
tinguished from one "charged with a public interest" is permissible 
at all under the police power; and that the act embodies such a 
regulation. 
3. That the act directly burdens interstate commerce. 
After Gundling v. Chicago,15 with the citation of which Mr. Jus-
tice McKENNA answered the first objection, it seems inexplicable 
that this point should have appeared as even plausible. Indeed, the 
cognate question of delegation of legislative power based upon the 
same view of the powers of the "commissioner" had been settled as 
to the Ohio constitution by both state and federal courts.16 More-
over, the provision for judicial review would seem to obviate any 
possible criticism on this ground. 
The second objection was not even mentioned by Mr. Justice 
McKENNA. At least two of the District Courts had made much of 
this point. Yet upo~ reflection it is believed that it will appear that 
the contention is wholly without merit, and that the Supreme Court 
rightly ignored it. The curious m~sapprehension that the police 
power.does not extend to so-called "private business" but is limited 
to such as may be "charged with a public interest" seems ~o have 
been suggested to the Michigan District Court11 by the fallacious 
decision of the Supreme Court of Michigan in People v. Berrien Cir-. 
cuit Judge,18 and is adopted seemingly without reservation by all the 
concurring district courts, SATER, D. J., of the Ohio court, adding 
only the citation of Butcher's Union Co. v. Crescent City Co.19 
It may be admitted that there are some State decisions, even of 
recent date, that seem to embody this singular idea. But surely no 
support is found for it in the recent decisions of the Supreme Court 
of the United States. As Mr. Justice McKENNA puts it in his 
opinion: 
.. 177 u. s. 183. 
u See Board of Health v. Greenville, 86 Oh. St. I ; Mutual Film Co • ..,.; Ohio Indus· 
trial Commission, 236 U. S. 230. . 
1
' See 210 Fed. 18o. 
11 124 Mich. 664, 667. 
1t III U. S. 746. 
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"That power [the police power of a State], we have said, 
is the least !imitable of the exercises of government. Sligh 
v. Kirkwood, 237 U. S. 52. We get no accurate idea of its 
limitations by opposing to it the declarations of the Four-
teenth Amendment. * * * Nob le State Bank v. Haskell, 219 
U. S. 104, IIO. 
"* * * All of these rights [of liberty and property] may 
be regulated. Such are the declarations of the cases, become 
platitudes by frequent repetition and many instances of ap-
plication". 
As to the effect of. the law as a regulatipn of interstate com-
merce, the Michigan District Court in Alabama &c. Co. v. Doyle,20 
had correctly assumed "that this inquiry, whether the burden is 
'direct', is only another form of the question whether the act is 
within the police power". That is fo say excepting, mainly, the very 
transportation of interstate commerce, the regulation of which lies 
within the exclusive field of congressional action, the various at-
tributes of that commerce are subject to the application of police 
measures, which the States may adopt and enforce unless and until 
·congress has occupied the field. There being no claim that Congress 
had so acted, nor that transportation, as such, was directly affected 
by the law before it, the only question remaining for the decision of 
the District Court was as to whether or not the law was a proper 
exercise of the police power. The Michigan court having already 
taken judicial notice of facts upon which the unreasonableness of the 
la:w, as a police measure, were necessarily predicated, the interstate 
commerce question was, of course, not even raised. . 
The other District Courts, however, failed to appreciate this point, 
and seemed to conceive of the interstate commerce question as 
wholly independent of the question as to the propriety Qf the pro-
visions of the respective laws as police measures, though some of 
them were disposed to admit, with the Michigan court, that if sus-
tainable as inspection laws, they might be upheld. Thus, in William 
R. Compton Co. v. Allen,21 a narrow view of what constitutes an 
"inspection", based upon People v. Compagnie Generale Trans-
atlantique,22 was taken, the duty of the State official charged with the 
administration of the particular "Blue Sky" law before the court was 
held not to fall within the definition of the term, and the conclusion 
that the requirements of the law cQnstituted therefore a direct burden 
on interstate commerce was immediately reached. In Bracey v. 
"210 Fed. 173, at p. r8<J.. 
21 216 Fed. 537. 
:D 107 u. s. 59. 
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Darst28 the only feature of the question discussed at all is the point 
that "stocks, bonds, debentures and other securities are subject-
matters of interstate commerce", but the decision is perhaps µot 
open to criticism here, for it would seem that if, as DAYTON, D. J., 
had held, the action for fraud, the punishment for obtaining prop-
erty by false pretenses, and the safeguarding of incorporation by 
the State of origin constitute ample prevention of the evils aimed at 
by the "Blue Sky" laws, inspection and licensure, as provided for in 
such laws, would be unnecessary and unreasonable as police meas-
. ures, quite apart from their effect on interstate commerce. 
The Ohio District Court also devoted a considerable portion of 
its opinion to establishing that stocks and bonds are subjects of 
commerce (a question which, it is believed, is not free from doubt). 
SATER, D. J., acknowledged the validity of police regulation "inci-
dentally" affecting interstate commerce, but upon the authority of 
International Te.xt Book Co. v. Pigg,2' Buck Stove Co. v. Vickers,2s 
and Cmtcher v. Kentucky,26 held the effect of the Ohio law to ht a 
"direct" burden thereon. 
Some discrimination is necessary here. It has been pointed out 
that the Ohio law, in common with most, if not all, of the other 
"Blue Sky" laws, interposes two agencies of prevention, viz: licen-
sure of the dealer, and inspection or certification of the thing dealt 
in. The Michigan, Iowa arid West Virginia decisions seem to dis-
regard the license feature, and to predicate the effect upon interstate 
commerce of the legislation under review upon the other.preventive 
meastJre, weighing it as a proper means of "inspection". The Ohio 
court, ·on the other hand, placing little, if any, stress upon the in-
spection feature, considered the interstate commerce question as 
made by the requirement of license. The one requirement, it will 
be observed, operates in a sense upon the thing sold, or upon the 
particular sale, to be consummated within the State; the other oper-
ates rather upon the business as a whole. 
The disposition of these two distinct questions by the Supreme 
Court is believed to be the least satisfactory part of Mr. Justice 
McKENNA'S opinion. He says~ 
"The provisions of the law * * * apply to dispositions of 
securities within the State, and while information of those 
issued in the States and foreign countries is required to be 
filed * * * they are only affected by the requirement of a 
'"218 Fed. 482. 
"' 217 u. s. gt • 
.. 226 u. s. 205, 213-216 • 
.. 141 u. s. 47. 
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license of one who deals in them within the State. Upon 
their transportation into the State there is no impediment-
no regulation of them or interference with them after they 
get them. There is the exaction only that he who disposes of 
them there shall be licensed to do so and this only that they 
may not appear in false character and impose an appearance 
of a value which they may not possess-and this certainly is 
only an indirect burden upon them as objects of interstate 
commerce, if they may be regarded as such. It is a: pblice 
regulation strictly, not affecting them until there is an attempt 
to make disposition of them within the State. To give them 
more immunity than this is to give them more immunity than 
more tangible articles are given, they having no exemption 
from regulations the purpose of which is to prevent fraud or 
deception. Such regulations affect interstate commerce in 
them only incidentally. Hat ch v. Reardon, 204 U. S. 152; 
Ware & Leland v. Mobile County, 209 U.S. 405; Engel v. 
O'Malley, 219 U. $. 128; Brodna~ v. Missouri, Id. 285; 
Banker Bros. v. Pennsylvania, 222 U. S. 210; Savage v. Jones, 
225 U. S. 501; Standard Stock Food Co. v. Wright, Id. 540; 
Trading Stamp Cases, supra. With these eases International 
Book Co. v. Pigg, 217 U. S. 91; Buck Stove & Range Co. v. 
Vickers, 226 U. S. 205, and the Lottery Cases, 88 U. S. 321, 
are not in discordance. 
We might, indeed, ask, When do the designated securities 
cease migration in interstate commerce and settle to the 
jurisdiction of the State? Material things, choses in posses-
sion, pass out of interstate commerce when they emerge from 
the original package. Do choses in action have a longer im-
munity? It is to be remembered that though they may differ 
in manner of transfer, they are in the same form in the hands 
of the purchaser as they are in the hands of the seller, and 
in the hands of both as they are brought into the 
State. We ask again, Do they never pass out of interstate 
commerce? Have they always the freedom of the State? Is 
there no point of time at which the State can expose the evil 
that they may mask? Is anything more necessary for the 
supremacy of the national power than that they be kept free 
when in actual transportation, subjected to the jurisdiction of 
the State only when they are attempted to be sold to the in-
dividual purchaser? The questions are pertinent, the an-
swers to them, one way or the other, of consequence; but we 
may pass them for regarding the securities as stiU in inter-
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state commerce after their transportation to the State is end-
ed and they have reached the hands of dealers in them, their 
interstate character is only incidentally affected by the 
statute." · 
A confusion of thought seems apparent-here. Yet the authorities 
cited seem to answer both of the two distinct questions which the 
opinion fails. to discuss as such. 
As to the inspection feature, it is submitted that the lower courts. 
· were wrong; and that the Supreme Court was right in holding, at 
least inferentially, that in so far as bringing stocks and bonds into 
a State for sale therein might be regarded as interstate commerce, 
an inquiry by the State into their intrinsic value in order to protect 
purchasers is an "inspection". It does not follow that because a 
given kind of inquiry may transcend the limits of an inspection when 
directed toward s9mething tangible and capable of ocular appraise-
ment or mechanical test, the same kind of inquiry is more than an 
inspection when its object is to ascertain the essential attnbutes of 
an intangible thing. Mr. Justice McKENNA well says, on this point, 
that ' 
"The principle applies as well to securities as to material 
products, the provisions of the law necessarily varying 'vith 
the objects." 
The greatest difficulty in the case is encountered when the con-
sideration of the question made by the license feature of the· law is 
reached. The Supreme Court seems to have felt this difficulty, if 
we may infer as much from the somewhat summary manner in which 
Mr. Justice McKENNA disposes of International Text Book Co. v. 
Pigg, Buck Stove &.Range Co. v. Vickers, and the· Lottery Cases, 
and. the character of the argument in the last paragraph of his 
opinion, which has been quoted. Yet it seems that the result ar-
rived at by the court may be justified in either of two wayf>, in spite 
of the failure of the opinion to discuss the point fully. 
The problem may be stated thus: In the Lottery Cases the trans-
portation of lottery tickets in interstate commerce was held to be 
subject to federal control, against the objection that they constituted 
mere choses in action. Therefore, it would seem that shares of stock 
and bonds, which may be assimilated to lottery tickets in respect of 
their essential character, must be held to be subjects of interstate 
commerce. In the Pigg and Vickers cases a State law, exacting a 
license from a foreign corporation as a condition of the transaction 
of interstate commerce business within the State, was held to be 
unconstitutional. The business thus regarded as interstate and com-
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mercial in character consisted of sending subjects of commerce 
(books, letters of instruction, and manufactured articles) into the 
State in pursuance of contracts calling for such transportation and 
delivery, regardless of where the contracts were made. Assuming 
that the Ohio law requires a license as a condition precedent to the 
sale, within the State, by a dealer to a purchaser,. of a bond or .a 
share of stock, the paper or certificate for which may at the time be 
in another State, so that interstate transportation of it is required to 
'complete delivery and discharge the contract, why is the law not un-
constitutional within the principles of these decisions? 
Mr. Justice McKsNNA apparently answers this question by assum-
ing that the law applies only to the sale or barter of things already in 
the State, so that the "original package" rule is the only one the 
application of which is involved. In other words, he treats the re-
quirement of the law as a "peddlers" license, as in Emert v. l.-!is-
souri,21 instead of in partial application, at least, a "drummer's" 
license, as in Robbins v. Shelby Co.28 The learned Justice appears to 
have overlooked the wide meaning of the term "dispose of" as de-
fined in the act.29 Yet it is believed that, even regarded as a "drum-
mer's license" the law, in this· r-espect, is valid; first, because the 
license feature of the law is merely a means of enforcing more 
effectually the inspection feature of it, and may be sustained as such 
if, as contended, the main purpose embodied in the latter may stand; 
and second, because the hypothetical transaction above described and 
likened to the activity of a "drummer" is not interstate commerce 
at all. 
The first point was seemingly admitted by the Michigan District 
Court, which held that the first Michigan act could not be sustained 
as a licensing law because the license in reality conferred no ultimat~ 
benefit or privilege upon the investment company or dealer, in that 
each issue of securities or item of business would be subject to 
scrutiny notwithstanding the licensure of the company or dealer. 
Accordingly it was held by that court that the law must stand or 
fall as an inspection measure, the license feature being incidental. 80 
This view of the relation of the license provision to the inspection 
feature of a law of the general character under discussion is be-
lieved to be correct. Reasonable inspection fees might have been 
exacted from the "dealer" or the "issuer" for each "security" the 
21 156 u. s. :zg6. 
23 I:ZO U. S. 489, 
" " 'Dispose of' shall be construed to mean 'Sell, barter, pledge, or assign for a 
valuable consideration or obtain subscriptions for.'" (16373·2). 
ao Sec :zxo Fed. 18.J. 
. 
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disposal of which within the State might be contemplated.31 The 
legislation under review substitutes the one license fee for all the 
inspection fees that might have been provided, save in the limited 
class of cases in which a "certificate" is required. On the other 
hand, as all the transactions, even the one assumed for the purpose 
of making a case like that of the "drummer" are subject to inspec-
tion, for the reasons stated, it is impossible to conceive of a "dis-
posal" within the State that is npt.subject to the State's police power. 
Surely a State may impose a license on reasonable terms as a con-
dition of transacting a business every ·feature or possible item of 
which is subject to its control; and if the mere fact that a possible 
item may be interstate and commercial in character is not enough to 
withdraw it from the State's control for the main purpose, it is clear 
that the dealer may not assert an unqualified right to transact it and 
a corresponding immunity from licensure. The Pigg and Vickers 
cases were decided upon the express ground that the activity licensed 
was commerce which the State cotild not by its legislation contro1.32 
Hence they are not opposed to the result reached. 
While the question has perhaps never been presented in a manner 
precisely similar to that in which it is raised by the "Blue Sky" laws, 
there are instances in which State regulations in the form of licenses 
have been upheld though applicable to interstate commerce trans-
actions, where, for some distinct reason, the transaction, though in-
terstate, was subject to State control until Congress should act.33 
The second point, above suggested, is valid for either of two dis-
tinct reasons. First, it is at least open to suspicion that the kinds of 
dealings in stocks and bonds which, after all the exemptions which 
the Ohio law affords are taken away; remain subject to licensure, 
are not "disposals" of particular shares or certificates, at all. Rather, 
it is believed that it is a fact that the true contract of "disposal" is 
an agreement on the part of the "dealer" to "dispose of" so many 
shares of stock, or so many bonds, of a given corporation, for ex-
ample, the seller being at liberty to acquire them for delivery where 
he will, so far .as the actual requirements of the contract are con-
cerned. If this is true, then the case comes squarely within Ware 
~Leland v. Mobile County,3' cited by Mr. Justice McKsNNA. In 
other words, on this· assumption the statute does not affect interstate 
commerce at all. 
n Red "C" Oil Co. v. North Carolina, 222 U. S. 380. 
12 See 217 U. S. uo. 
a See Smith v. Alabama, 124 U. S. 465 ; Hendrick v. Marylan4, 235 U. s;. 610; 
Broadnax v. Missouri, 219 U. S. 285 • 
.. 209 u. s. 405. 
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In the second place, it seems possible to demonstrate that selling 
shares of stock or bonds can never constitute interstate commerce. 
To be sure, the act of transporting the certificates or other papers 
from one State to another is interstate commerce, because all trans-
portation is commerce. For this postulate the Lottery Cases85 are 
authority. But it is submitted that, under the Lottery Cases, the 
act of transporting insurance policies from one State to another is 
likewise interstate commerce; whereas it is now perfectly well settled 
that making a contract of insurance is not a commercial act, though 
naturally prece_ded by interstate correspondence and followed by the 
interstate shipment of the policy.86 This being so, it is further sub-
mitted that a sale or contract within a State is not an interstate com-
merce transaction if the thing sold or contracted for is not itself 
to be transported from one State to another in discharge of the con-
tract of sale, and if the only interstate transportation involved is that 
of some mere written memorandum, muniment of title, certificate 
of relationship or evidence of a chose in action. The adjudicated 
cases appear to have drawn the line here.87 However valuable in-
trinsically, a certificate of stock may be, and to whatever extent it 
may be regarded as distinct property for the purposes of larceny and 
execution, it is not the very thing sold or dealt in, but merely evi-
dence of it. In the Lottery Cases themselves, Mr. Justice li.ARLAN, 
delivering the majority opinion,88 asserts that "A State * * * may 
forbid all sales of lottery tickets within jts limits" and denies the 
incompatibility of such power with that of Congress to forbid the 
transportation of the tickets. 
The lower federal courts were frankly puzzled about the relation 
between the Lottery Cases and Paul v. Virginia and its companfons. 
The above stated hypothesis seems to reconcile them, and to furnish 
a rule by which the decision in the ptjncipal case may be further 
supported. 
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